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EUROSCEPTIC YOUTH
Interest, trust and ideology1
Robert Grimm, Gary Pollock and Mark Ellison 
Introduction
Euroscepticism moved from the margins to the centre in national and European politics and is 
now a persistent and potent feature of contemporary politics (Hooghe and Marks 2007). European 
integration has been rejected through plebiscite in recent years in a number of countries 
culminating in the so-called Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (UK) in June 2016. Once 
a phenomenon of the opposition, Euroscepticism can now be found among parties in government 
and it also cuts across the left–right political spectrum. Moreover, an anti-integration bloc of 
parties is permanently present in the European Parliament and has been growing to unprecedented 
levels following the European Parliament elections in 2014 (Delanty 2015). 
The EU has been primarily an economic project driven by the premise that creating a common 
market in goods, services, labour and capital will improve competitiveness and safeguard peaceful 
cooperation. Opposition against this consensus remained marginal until the 1990s. The Maastricht 
Treaty fundamentally changed the nature of the EU. The treaty transformed the European Union 
(EU) from a predominantly economic project into a political and socio-cultural one. 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) presupposed the implementation of a relatively 
rigid economic and legal framework. New supranational governing institutions had to be 
established and national competencies subsequently transferred from nation states to the 
supranational level of the EU. In other words, post-Maastricht the process of European 
integration encompassed a sociopolitical as much as an economic dimension. There has also 
been a concerted effort to create a European political space. With the establishment of the 
European Parliament citizens of EU member states have become entitled to participate in 
transnational European elections. The drive towards political union and the idea of European 
citizenship challenged the sovereignty of member states. Simultaneously the end of the cold war 
fundamentally altered the geopolitical situation of Europe. EU membership increased rapidly 
through enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe. Given these fundamental changes 
concerning the essence of the EU, its institutional underpinnings and its geography, it is not 
surprising that ever more citizens have become sceptical about the impact of further integration.
Euroscepticism refers to scepticism about the idea of Europe, the process of European 
integration (Hooghe and Marks 2007) or the unsettled and contested character of the EU (de 
Wilde and Trenz 2012). A wealth of political science literature explores and analyses the 
phenomenon from different viewpoints. Many authors investigate Euroscepticism from a 
political party perspective, understanding it as a product of the competition between parties in 
government and parties in opposition (Sitter 2001; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2002, 2003). A 
significant effort has been made to conceptualise the multiplicity of positions and to develop 
classifications of the intensity of scepticism, which can range from outright rejection of the idea 
of Europe to subsets of negative attitudes about particular European policies. 
Other scholars focus on the motivation for negative perceptions of the EU among the 
general population. Research differentiates between socio-economic groups: Leconte (2010), 
for instance, points out that there is a persistent gap between men and women where the latter 
are less supportive of European integration (see also Nelsen and Guth 2000). Utilitarian models 
distinguish between ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of integration and suggest that education and skills 
may impact on the level of support for the EU (Gabel and Palmer 1995). Building on Inglehart’s 
work Janssen (1991) proposes that young people are more likely to be supportive of the EU 
because they are least likely to be attached to traditional materialist values. Most studies take 
into account the heterogeneous character of member states and explore variations of scepticism 
across nations.
This chapter provides a cross-national perspective on Euroscepticism among young people. 
It is based on survey data from the Framework Seven Research Project Memory, Youth 
Political Legacy and Civic Engagement (MYPLACE). Respondents were aged 16 to 25 at the 
time of the MYPLACE survey in 2012/2013. Most grew up in a post-materialist value system 
(Inglehart 1977) in post-socialist Europe and were born after the Maastricht Treaty was signed. 
The chapter firstly explores young people’s trust in the European Commission and the 
perceived benefit of membership of the European Union. Secondly we use multivariate logistic 
regression to study the association of Euroscepticism with young people’s trust in national 
political institutions, satisfaction with democracy, left–right orientation, nativism and their 
socio-demographic characteristics. The primary analytic variable is regional location. 
In this chapter we use the following wording to gain an indicator of support for European 
integration: ‘Consider the following statements and indicate whether you agree or disagree. 
Membership of the European Union greatly benefits this country’. This question and similar 
variants are commonly used, for example in the Eurobarometer surveys (see Chapter 16 in this 
Handbook), to measure Euroscepticism (Loveless and Rohrschneider 2011). We follow 
Eichenberg and Dalton (2007; see also Anderson 1998) who argue that EU membership 
represents an existential fact of the integration process, i.e. that the logic of being in the EU 
includes a broad acceptance of continued Europe-wide cooperation with the prospect of 
deeper integrating practices. Endorsing membership implies endorsing the process of 
integration itself. We categorised as Eurosceptic those young people who disagreed with the 
statement that membership of the EU benefited their country. This simple definition covers a 
range of ‘sceptics’ including those with ‘hard’ and ‘diffuse’ ‘Euroreject’ positions and those 
with ‘soft’, ‘specific’, ‘revisionist’ positions (see Chapters 1 to 3 in this Handbook for a review 
of these concepts). 
Explaining Euroscepticism
Classifications and typologies present helpful tools to define Euroscepticism and to unpack 
variations in the intensity and the degree of citizens’ attitudes towards Europe. However, they 
say little about the motivation for political dissent. The literature proposes a number of 
explanations. Gabel (1998) for instance suggests that there are five individual-level theories 
about public support for European integration. These include cognitive mobilisation, political 
values, utilitarian appraisals, class partisanship and support for national government. Sørensen 
(2008) proposes a typology of four motivators that underpin attitudes towards Europe: economic 
utilitarian perspectives, sovereignty-based critiques, democratic and social Euroscepticism. 
Leconte (2010) also differentiates between four varieties: utilitarian, political, value-based and 
cultural Euroscepticism – labelling the last ‘cultural anti-Europeanism’. In this chapter we will 
explore four theories: cognitive mobilisation, utilitarian explanations, trust in instructional 
performance, and the role of ideology in determining young people’s attitudes to Europe.
Cognitive mobilisation
Higher levels of cognitive mobilisation are associated with support for European integration. 
Increased access to information about the EU makes the EU appear less distant and threatening 
(Inglehart 1977). Skills and knowledge determine a person’s ability to process information at an 
abstract level, to understand political messages and the way in which an individual can relate 
these messages to their own personal situation (Janssen 1991). In post-Brexit-referendum UK 
an apocryphal story goes that the most frequent online search was ‘what is the EU’, and 
assertions that a great many voters did not fully understand the role of the EU. The education 
divide, or knowledge deficit, appears to be associated with populist and anti-Europe sentiment 
(Runciman 2016).
We hypothesise that Eurosceptics have lower levels of political interest, spend less time 
informing themselves about politics and lack basic political knowledge.
Utilitarian determinants
The utilitarian model builds on cost-benefit analysis: ‘citizens evaluate the economic 
consequences of European integration for themselves and for the groups of which they are part’ 
(Hooghe and Marks 2005: 420). Creating growth-oriented economic environments is a primary 
EU policy objective and the EU therefore promotes economic liberalisation and deregulation. 
EU policies aim to rebalance resource allocation towards knowledge intensive industries and 
discourage member states from subsidising uncompetitive economic sectors. The macroeconomic 
programme of the EU is based on anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary policies (Gabel and 
Palmer 1995) and the legal framework of EMU prevents countries from making monetary 
adjustments to encourage growth. Neo-liberal growth-oriented European economic policies 
have a major impact on labour market structures and participation. Individuals with high levels 
of human capital and specialised skill sets find it easier to adjust to deregulated labour markets 
while those population groups with lower qualifications will become marginalised. The 
utilitarian model implies a distinction between economic losers and winners of European 
integration and suggests that individuals benefitting from the EU’s economic policies will be 
more likely to support European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2005). 
MYPLACE respondents were still in education during the time of the survey. Educational 
attainment is therefore not a robust measure for young people’s socio-economic status or their 
prospects in the labour market. The family is an important location of transmission of political 
values and political socialisation. We, therefore, use parental social class composed of parental 
occupational status and educational attainment as a proxy to assess the socio-economic status of 
our respondents. We complement this parental social class variable with a subjective measure of 
household income (‘Do you believe your household is coping on current income?’). 
Additionally, we assume that lack of socio-economic participation will negatively impact on 
young people’s general life satisfaction.
We hypothesise that young people from families with lower socio-economic status, who 
live in households that find it difficult to cope on present income, and who are dissatisfied 
with life in general, will be least likely to perceive membership in the EU as beneficial for 
their country.
Democratic performance
Trust in political institutions is a performance measure that evaluates the process of political 
participation and policy outcomes. Trust in European institutions is changing: EU citizens 
are no longer governed by a single layer of institutions; in addition to national governments 
supranational and subnational layers (increasing number of local governments and devolution) 
of governance now constitute the political system to which citizens lend their support. Trust 
in EU institutions is likely to be mediated through a mechanism of institutional proxy where 
national institutions provide citizens with a short cut towards trust in EU institutions. 
According to Anderson (1998), trust in domestic political institutions positively influences 
attitudes towards the EU and Harteveld et al. (2013) suggest that satisfaction with national 
democracy is strongly associated with confidence in the EU. Other scholars came to different 
results. Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) argues that low levels of trust in national political institutions 
result in stronger public support for the EU because EU institutions are substitutes for 
ineffective and weak domestic institutions. Similarly Munoz et al. (2011), analysing European 
Social Survey data, conclude that that trust in national institutions can have a negative and a 
positive effect on attitudes towards the EU. In situations of multi-level-governance people 
compensate shortcomings in one layer with trust in a higher or lower institutional layer. 
Citizens in countries suffering from poor democratic performance because of, for instance, 
high levels of corruption, lack of transparency and democratic accountability and low 
efficacy, have little to lose from transferring sovereignty to Europe. As Sánchez-Cuenca 
(2000: 151) puts it, ‘the better the performance of the national political system, and the 
worse that of the supranational system, the greater the opportunity cost of supporting 
integration’. In this chapter, we will explore the relationship between attitudes to EU 
membership with trust in the European Commission, trust in national political institutions 
and general satisfaction with democracy. 
We hypothesise that young people with low levels of trust in European and national political 
institutions and high levels of satisfaction with democracy are most likely to be Eurosceptic. 
Ideological determinants
European nation states have historically rooted cultural identities and it would be naïve to 
think that people will give up on their national identities for a supranational one (Mouffe 
2013). A considerable number of publications focus on feelings of cultural, political and social 
national attachments as important predictors of attitudes towards European integration. 
European integration may provoke a sense of loss of identity among citizens with strong 
national attachment. The transfer of power away from nation states to the EU makes it 
difficult for governments to pursue national interests; it blurs boundaries between distinct 
communities and questions exclusionary identities of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Hooghe and Marks 
2005: 423). The left–right dimension is an enduring marker of ideological positions and 
continues to structure political choice in domestic politics. Populist radical right parties share 
a core ideology that includes the combination of nativism, affinity to authoritarianism and 
populism (Mudde 2013). They are the most Eurosceptic party family (Hooghe et al. 2002) 
and use the fear of political, cultural and economic nationalism as a defence against the loss of 
sovereignty and the centralisation of power in EU institutions. McLaren (2002) demonstrated 
that antipathy for other cultures stemming from nationalistic attachment is an important 
predictor of support for European integration. Similarly, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) 
illustrate that anti-immigration sentiment is associated with Euroscepticism. Leconte (2010) 
emphasises the link between broader conservative attitudes towards women’s and minority 
rights and individual liberties and public order and feelings towards Europe. Her cultural anti-
Europeanism corresponds with Skinner’s (2012, 2013) national-identity-based Euroscepticism, 
with both of them incorporating elements such as cultural threat, distrust of other countries’ 
judicial systems and xenophobia. Vasilopoulou (2009), nevertheless, points out that populist 
radical right parties are far from a homogenous party family and that sentiments for Europe 
are nuanced even among the radical right. Some reject the EU outright and propagate a hard 
Euroscepticism, like UKIP for instance, while other parties such as Alternative for Germany 
may reject further European integration and EMU but support liberal common market 
policies (Grimm, 2015). 
We hypothesise that youth who conceive of their national identity as exclusive of other 
territorial identities will have the tendency to be more Eurosceptic than citizens who understand 
national identity in more inclusive terms. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that European integration has become a left-leaning project 
because it holds out the prospect of continent-wide regulation that acts as a constraint on 
markets (Hooghe and Marks 2005). The European radical left, however, shares a fierce anti-
neo-liberalism (Charalambous 2011) and, because of the liberal economic doctrine at the heart 
of the EU, the radical left is traditionally Eurosceptic. Recent macroeconomic policies and 
externally imposed welfare reform are perceived as conflicting with the interests of the 
working people. 
We hypothesise that there is a link between left–right self-placement and attitudes towards 
Europe. However, we do not expect a uniform picture concerning this association. Rather we 
suspect that the relationship will be determined by national context. 
Country comparisons
Member states’ national histories and cultures are intrinsically heterogeneous. Support for the 
EU varies significantly by countries reflecting differing baselines, produced by what 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) call ‘national tradition’. Díez Medrano (2003), in exploring 
the cases of the UK, Spain and Germany, argues that national histories are important 
determinants of attitudes towards Europe. While British Euroscepticism is rooted in the 
legacy of empire for instance, German pro-Europeanism is embedded in the politics of 
Westbindung after the experience of National Socialism and the Second World War. Verney 
(2011) observed that, in Greece, Spain and Portugal, support of the EU is seated in the desire 
for democratisation. These countries (used to) rank among the most Euro-enthusiast in 
Europe because (until recently) integration was perceived as a road to modernisation. There 
are also border-spanning themes such as political transformations associated with post-
socialism. Other authors argued that size of a country can play a role. Duff (2013) suggests 
that Euroscepticism would seem to be more prevalent in smaller central European countries 
because their national identity can be perceived as threatened in a large union whereas larger 
countries rely on national strength. However, the growing threat of Russia in recent years 
might have the opposite effect on smaller nations in the Baltics for instance and drive these 
nations closer towards the EU.
We hypothesise that while we may be able to discern commonalities among young people 
across Europe, national context will be an important determinant of attitudes towards Europe. 
MYPLACE data
The MYPLACE questionnaire survey is a common research instrument administered to a 
representative sample of 16–25 year olds in 30 separate locations in 14 different countries. The 
data was collected between September 2012 and April 2013, with an achieved overall sample 
of 16,935.2 Each participating country selected two contrasting locations (with four in Germany: 
two in the old East and two in the old West) where the criterion for selection was that there 
were a priori reasons to suggest that the attitudes, behaviour and experiences of the young 
people would be different in their propensity to have radical political opinions. This means that 
we have a range of research sites, each with distinct features which are unique to themselves and 
which require an understanding of local as well as national contexts to fully appreciate the 
reasons why young people hold the attitudes they do. It is important to reiterate that these are 
a series of local case studies and not nationally representative results. 
Participating countries in MYPLACE reflect a broad range of European diversity in terms of 
their length of membership and their intensity of integration (for instance, EMU and Schengen 
membership). Contrasting welfare regimes and historic legacies (post-socialist, southern 
European dictatorships as well as long-established stable democracies) ensure that the many 
different experiences of which the EU is composed are represented. We can also differentiate 
between degrees of impact of the recent economic crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, with 
stable economies in the north (Germany, Finland) and economies struggling with austerity 
measures in the south (Greece, Portugal and Spain). 
Data analysis
Firstly, we explore the level of trust in the European Commission and the perceived benefits of 
membership of the EU across the research locations of the MYPLACE study. Secondly, we 
conduct a series of multivariate logistic regression analyses, one for each of the 26 locations, to 
identify relationships between different sets of predictor variables and support for European 
integration. We use perceived benefit of membership in the European Union as the dependent 
variable. Perceived benefit is a rational-choice cost-benefit variable that has been used frequently 
to assess attitudes towards the EU (see for instance McLaren 2002). The measure is also included 
in Eurobarometer studies.
The descriptive data in Figure 17.1 is based on the Likert-scale-type item (‘Do you think 
that EU membership benefits your country?’).3 We created a binary variable for which we 
coded disagree and very disagree as ‘1’ and all other responses as ‘0’. Figure 17.1 presents the 
percentages of respondents who disagree that membership of the EU benefits their country. In 
Bremen (GER-W), Jena (GER-E), Tartu (EST) and Odense (DEN) fewer than 10 per cent of 
young people disagreed that EU membership has been beneficial for their country. In contrast, 
respondents in Pescenica (CRO), Ozd (HUN), Podsljeme (CRO), and New Philadelphia 
(GRE) are more than three times as likely to be Eurosceptic.
Euroscepticism is particularly prevalent among youth in locations in southern and central 
European post-socialist countries like Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia, whereas in northern 
and central European locations – including in Germany and Denmark – Euroscepticism is less 
pronounced. Scandinavian countries are often considered to be traditionally Eurosceptic 
(Milner 2000; Raunio 2007), but our data suggests that young Danes in the Odense region 
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Figure 17.1  Perceived benefits of membership of the EU and trust in the European Commission by 
MYPLACE research locations
are among the least likely to be Eurosceptic. While young Finns in Kuopio and Lieksa/
Nurmes are nearly twice as likely as the Danes to be Eurosceptic, they, nonetheless, are still 
a lot less Eurosceptic than most of the young people from post-socialist countries. At the time 
of the survey the populist Finns Party (Perussuomalainen), an openly Eurosceptic party, was 
increasing in popularity and may be a partial explanation for this finding.
North–South and East–West differences in the data suggest that economic challenges, welfare 
regimes and historic legacies shape young people’s perception of Europe. Nonetheless, the picture 
is not homogeneous. For instance, only 9 per cent of respondents in Tartu (Estonia) were 
Eurosceptic compared with 21 per cent in Lieksa/Nurmes (Finland). Euroscepticism among young 
people in locations in traditionally Europhile countries such as Portugal and Spain (Royo and 
Manuel 2003) remains relatively marginal despite externally imposed austerity policies. This is 
paradoxical given the pronounced Euroscepticism among young people in Greek research locations. 
It should also be noted that, despite the proximity of attitudes towards the EU among 
respondents in research locations in the same country (Denmark for instance), there are also 
remarkable variations between regions within a single nation. For instance, the proportion of 
respondents having a negative view of membership in the EU is twice as large in Bremerhaven 
when compared to Bremen. The situation is similar in Greece where 22 per cent of young 
Argyroupoulians but 39 per cent of New Philadelphians contest that membership in the EU is 
positive for Greece.
Figure 17.1 suggests that trust in the European Commission follows a similar regional 
distribution to the perceived benefits of membership. Young people in research locations in 
Greece have the lowest level of trust in the European Commission while locations in Germany, 
Denmark and Tartu in Estonia are among those with the highest mean values. Respondents in 
post-socialist research locations (with the exception of Tartu in Estonia) are among the least 
trusting, while those in locations in Northern European established liberal democracies are most 
trusting. The Iberian locations in Portugal and Spain have comparable scores and are mid-table. 
Despite these cross-national regional affinities reflecting similar welfare regimes, historic legacies 
and contemporary economic challenges, the data reveals again intra-national differences. Thus 
respondents in Nuneaton and Coventry in the UK are significantly different in their attitudes 
towards the European Commission.
Multivariate analysis
We use as our dependent variable perceived benefit of membership of the EU. The variable was 
originally a Likert scale item that we recoded to ‘0’ = agree that membership benefits the 
country and ‘1’ = disagree that membership benefits the country. 
Following our theoretical discussion we explore the influence of four sets of predictors on 
the attitudes of young people towards Europe using binary logistic regression. Firstly we 
investigate the influence of respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics on their attitude 
towards EU membership. Secondly we explore the European dimension through interest in 
Europe – an eleven-point scale variable (0 = no interest, 10 = maximum interest) that 
measures mobilisation and political confidence at the European level – and trust in the 
European Commission – an eleven-point scale that measures young peoples’ evaluation of 
the democratic processes and policy outcomes associated with top-level European institutions 
(0 = no trust, 10 = maximum trust). Thirdly we explore the influence of trust in national 
political institutions, general political interest and political knowledge on the perceived 
benefit of membership in the EU. Fourthly we consider variables that measure the ideological 
position of our respondents. We include a left–right self-placement scale and respondents’ 
attitude to nativism in this model. The research location is used rather than the nation or the 
pooled aggregated dataset for the analysis because this is the level at which the data is 
representative and we wish to identify similarities and differences in the data that cut across 
national boundaries and that are indicative of common political systems, contemporary 
challenges and historical legacies. We therefore present a series of models for each location 
and discuss the patterns in relation to that which is important within a location, but also 
patterns that appear to exist between  locations. We tested four models for each location as 
described above and present in Table 17.1 the results of the model for each location with the 
best fit using the change in log-likelihood test (-2LL) to assess the contribution of further 
variables. This means that not all location models contain coefficients for each covariate as, 
during each of the four stages, we dropped those variables that did not contribute significantly 
to the model. We believe that this is the most robust way to proceed with the analysis as it is 
theoretically and not empirically driven. It also helps to differentiate between locations where 
simple models are as adequate as more complex ones.
Table 17.1 shows the results of the best fitting models for each location. The table is ordered 
such that the most Eurosceptic locations are presented first as shown by the percentage that 
disagree that the EU is of benefit to their country. 
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Socio-demographic characteristics (model 1 variables)
Gender has a significant effect on young peoples’ perception of European integration in six out 
of twenty-six locations including Coventry and Nuneaton in the UK, Ozd in Hungary, 
Podsljeme in Croatia, Lieksa and Nurmes in Finland and Sant Cugat in Spain. Of these, other 
than Ozd and Podsljeme, the odds for being Eurosceptic are higher for men than for women. 
These are strong relationships in that men are more than twice as likely as women to perceive 
membership of the EU as negative when all other variables are kept constant.
Based on the citizenship and ethnic belonging of MYPLACE respondents we computed 
a binary ‘identity’ variable to distinguish the majority population from minority groups. 
The data suggests that collective identity has an effect only in three out of twenty-six 
research locations (New Philadelphia in Greece, Ozd in Hungary and Coventry in the UK). 
In all three locations, being a member of a minority population increases the probability of 
being Eurosceptic. 
We argued earlier that highly qualified citizens are more resilient in the EU’s neo-liberal 
economic environment and that their status is least threatened by present economic policy 
directives. Citizens with lower or no skill sets find themselves increasingly excluded from full 
labour market participation and their social status has become precarious. On the basis of this 
argument one can distinguish between the winners and losers of European integration. We 
assume that those who benefit from EU integration will be less likely to be Eurosceptic than 
those who experience marginalisation. Many MYPLACE respondents were still in education at 
the time of the survey. We therefore use parental social class as a proxy to assess whether skills 
and occupational status have an association with support for the EU. For this purpose, we 
developed a parental social class classification based on parents’ educational attainment and 
occupational status where 0 = least socio-economic status and 3 = maximum socio-economic 
status. We also use variables ‘household coping on present income’ (1 = coping, 0 = not 
coping) and a single eleven-point scale measuring young peoples’ general satisfaction with life 
(0 = extremely dissatisfied, 1 = extremely satisfied) to explore the losers and winners of our 
European integration thesis.
Social class is shown to be significantly associated with Euroscepticism only in Trnava 
(Slovakia) where, against our assumption, for every additional increase in respondents’ 
parental class position the likelihood of being Eurosceptic increases. For all other locations 
the association was not significant. The lack of a social class effect is, perhaps, surprising. 
Our view, however, is that this makes sense in relation to the overriding importance of 
local context and more-direct experiential variables such as income. Indeed, the question 
asking about respondents ‘coping on income’ shows a significant relationship with the 
dependent variable in six research locations including Pescenica Zitnjak (Croatia), 
Agenskalns (Latvia), Barreiro (Portugal), Nuneaton (UK), Sopron (Hungary), Trnava 
(Slovakia). In each of these locations not coping is associated with youth with a greater 
propensity for Euroscepticism. General satisfaction with life operates in a similar way with 
those least satisfied always being associated with Euroscepticism. It is significant in four out 
of twenty-six locations (New Philadelphia in Greece, Trnava in Slovakia, St Cugat in Spain, 
and Rostock in East Germany). 
The data delivered significant results for a limited number of locations. When significant, the 
data behaved as suggested in existing theory (with the exception of social class), that is, young 
people who are socio-economically marginalised have a greater propensity towards 
Euroscepticism. Gender is an important predictor of attitudes towards Europe also among 
younger generations. Young men are more likely to be Eurosceptic than young women.
European dimensions (model 2 variables)
We use two predictor variables in this model: interest in Europe (an eleven-point scale where 
0 = no interest and 10 = maximum interest) and trust in the European Commission (an eleven-
point scale where 0 = no trust and 10 = complete trust). Interest in Europe is significantly 
associated with the dependent variable in eight research locations (Argyroupouli and New 
Philadelphia in Greece, Rimavska Sobota in Slovakia, Podsljeme in Croatia, Sopron in 
Hungary, Narva in Estonia, Sant Cugat de Vales in Spain and Rostock in East Germany). In 
these locations, those with lower interest in the EU are most likely to disagree that membership 
in the EU has been positive for their country. Trust in the European Commission is a strong 
predictor for attitudes towards Europe. We observe an association of scepticism towards the EU 
and (lack of) trust in the Commission in fourteen of the twenty-six research locations. The 
results show a greater propensity to disagree that membership in the EU benefited the 
respondents’ country where levels of trust in the European Commission are low. There are 
some interesting geographic patterns in the data: in every research location in Scandinavia and 
in the UK, the association is significant suggesting that trust in the European Commission is an 
important determinant of (negative) sentiments towards the EU in traditionally Eurosceptic 
countries. However, lack of trust in this key European institution is also a significant driver of 
Euroscepticism in Greece, Portugal and Spain. Trust in the European Commission appears less 
relevant for Eastern European research locations where only data for Ozd (Hungary) and 
Pescenica (Croatia) is significant. Overall interest in Europe and trust in the Commission are 
important predictors of Euroscepticism. Low interest and low levels of trust increase the 
likelihood of Eurosceptic attitudes among MYPLACE respondents. 
Cognitive capacity and national democratic performance (model 3 variables)
Political literacy presumes that people have a basic knowledge about political institutions, 
processes and ideological positions (Cassel and Celia 1997). Knowledge of politics is a direct 
measure of political literacy while time used informing oneself about politics is an indirect 
indicator of political literacy. Political literacy is instrumental for the understanding of abstract 
governmental structures and institutions (Deny and Doyle 2008), like the supranational EU, 
and lowers the costs of political mobilisation. We assume that knowledge of politics is an 
indicator of political confidence and, in line with the mobilisation thesis, we hypothesise that 
Euroscepticism will increase with a lack of political knowledge. We used a basic three-item 
knowledge question to develop a scale where 0 = no knowledge and 3 = maximum knowledge. 
Political knowledge is significant in only three research locations – Argyroupouli (Greece), 
Agenskalns (Latvia) and Odense East (Denmark). The variable’s effect works both ways. In 
Argyroupouli (1.7) and in Odense East (3.064) the odds for respondents to be Eurosceptic 
increase with basic political knowledge while in Agenskalns in Latvia they decrease (0.79). 
Time spent informing oneself using different media is associated with Euroscepticism in four 
research locations (Forstadte and Jaunbuve in Latvia, Narva in Estonia, Podsljeme in Croatia, 
Sopron in Hungary). Again, following the mobilisation thesis we assume that those who spend 
more time informing themselves about politics are the least likely to be Eurosceptic. In all four 
research locations, Euroscepticism increases with political media consumption. The effect sizes, 
however, are very marginal. 
Trust in national political institutions (a composite variable constructed with measures of 
trust in national parliament, political parties and the head of government) show significant 
results in six research locations (New Philadelphia in Greece, Pescenica and Podsljeme in 
Croatia, Forstadte and Jaunbuve in Latvia, Narva and Tartu in Estonia). In all locations, the 
odds of respondents being Eurosceptic decrease with falling trust in national political institutions. 
Respondents who are least trusting are the most likely to be Eurosceptic. Political cynicism or, 
more precisely, agreeing with the statement that politicians are corrupt has a significant 
relationship with Euroscepticism only in Kuopio in Finland. The lack of satisfaction with 
democracy is one of the most frequently associated variables with Euroscepticism. It shows 
significant results in ten locations (Ozd in Hungary, Pescenica in Croatia, Rimavska Sobota in 
Slovenia, Argyroupouli in Greece, Kuopio in Finland, Narva and Tartu in Estonia, Telheiras in 
Portugal, Odense in East Denmark and Jena in East Germany). The association is also consistent: 
Euroscepticism decreases with higher satisfaction with the way democracy works. 
Overall political confidence and mobilisation measures (knowledge and time spent informing 
oneself about politics) are weak predictors of Euroscepticism amongst MYPLACE respondents. 
If significant, the relationship can go both ways. We can potentially explain these variations 
with different types of media consumption and media content to which our time-use scale was 
not sensitive. In terms of political knowledge we must perhaps accept that discomfort about the 
lack of democratic accountability for recent macroeconomic policies like the establishment of 
the European Stability Mechanism has been growing, particularly among educated elites. In 
other words, knowledge about politics may indeed increase resentment towards European 
integration in its current form. This type of specialist knowledge is not included in our basic 
knowledge scale. Important predictors of Euroscepticism are, however, trust in national 
governments and satisfaction with democracy. Particularly the latter draws a consistent picture 
where dissatisfaction with democracy increases the propensity towards Euroscepticism. This is 
in line with existing literature that argues that performance evaluations of national democracy 
determine attitudes towards supranational governmental structures.
Ideological dimension (model 4 variables)
Following current discussions of cultural Euroscepticism we assume that those who favour 
high barriers for full citizenship of foreign born and ethnic minorities are also more likely to 
be Eurosceptic. We computed a nativism variable composed of four items measuring attitudes 
to requirements for full citizenship and cultural assimilation (having at least one parent who 
was born in the country, respected its laws and spoke a national language). The nativism 
variable shows significant results in six research locations (Agenskalns in Latvia, Rimavska 
Sobota in Slovenia, Rostock in East Germany, Sant Cugat in Spain, Sopron in Croatia and 
Telheiras in Portugal). However, the relationship between nativism and Euroscepticism is not 
uniform. In some locations such as Rostock nativism increases the odds to be Eurosceptic by 
1.15 while in Sopron it decreases the odds by 0.798 or 20 per cent. We speculate that there 
are important local reasons for these opposite effects. Rostock is a large German university 
city deep in Germany historically linked to xenophobia, rioting and hate crime whereas 
Sopron is a large Hungarian town very close the Austrian border. Sopron has long benefited 
from border trade and short-term migration. The picture is equally heterogeneous for the 
left–right self-placement scale. High values suggest proximity to the far right while low scores 
on the scale suggest that respondents place themselves on the far left of the political spectrum. 
The relationship between left–right scores and our dependent variable is significant in six 
research locations (Agenskalns (LAV), Odense East (DEN), Pescenica (CRO), Sopron 
(HUN), Sant Cugat (SPA), Jena (GER-E)). While Euroscepticism is associated with self-
placement on the political right in Jena, it is associated with self-placement on the left in other 
research locations. 
Conclusion
There are considerable variations in the propensity for Euroscepticism among young 
Europeans. Disagreement that membership of the EU is positive can range from 39 per cent 
in New Philadelphia in Greece to 8.5 per cent in Jena. Young people in Eastern European 
research locations and in Greece are most likely to harbour negative sentiment for the EU. 
Northern European youth, particularly in Denmark and Germany, are least likely to be 
Eurosceptic. There are, however, exceptions. There are also significant differences between 
research locations within countries. In other words the level and intensity of scepticism 
depends on local context; it is not homogeneously distributed across the EU or within 
individual nations. 
Our data also confirms that the losers of globalisation theory have significant explanatory 
value in some locations. Young people who live in households that do not cope with their 
present income and who are generally dissatisfied with their lives are most prone to be 
Eurosceptics. Perhaps surprisingly, the socio-economic status of parents has no effect on 
scepticism about EU integration.
Measures of political confidence, political knowledge and time spent to inform about politics 
have a limited explanatory value. Variables determining young peoples’ evaluation of national 
political institutions and democracy in general are more frequently significant and consistent 
with theory. In particular, satisfaction with democracy shows an association with Euroscepticism. 
The data is suggestive that a negative performance evaluation of national democracies acts as a 
proxy for Euroscepticism among young people.
Ideological values and attitudes have an effect on Euroscepticism in a number of locations 
but the effect can go in opposite directions and increase or decrease the propensity for 
Euroscepticism. In some respects this is in line with current scholarship and political realities. 
Opposition to European integration is a common phenomenon among the extreme right and 
the extreme left although for different ideological reasons. 
Interest in Europe and trust in the European Commission are by far the most robust 
predictors for Euroscepticism among MYPLACE respondents. Scepticism is uniformly driven 
by lack of interest in the EU and lack of trust in the European Commission. The European 
Commission is the EU’s executive body responsible for proposing legislation, implementing 
decisions and upholding the EU treaties, and represents the interests of the Union as a whole. 
Lack of institutional trust is indicative for young peoples’ negative evaluation of democratic 
processes (possibilities for participation for young people, lack of transparency) and policy 
outcomes (in the interest of individuals and collectives) at EU level. 
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Notes
1 Funding statement
Data presented in this chapter has been collected as part of Memory Youth Political Legacy 
and Civic Engagement research project. This project has received funding from the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development 
and demonstration under grant agreement no. 266831.
2 For the purpose of the analysis here, the locations in Russia and Georgia were not included as they are not in 
the EU nor (unlike Croatia) were they about to join. The sample size for the remaining 26 locations is 14,329.
3 At the time of the survey, Croatia was not yet a member state so the wording of the question is 
hypothetical, and concerns the perceived future benefits of membership. 
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